We prove both the validity and the sharpness of the law of the iterated logarithm in game-theoretic probability with quadratic and stronger hedges.
2A n ln ln A n = 1.
Theorem 1.2 (Theorem 5.2 in [8]).
In the unbounded forecasting protocol, Skeptic can force
In the unbounded forecasting protocol, it seems difficult to give a natural sufficient condition to force the lower bound of the LIL (cf. Proposition 5.1 of [8] ). Then we would like to find a non-predictable protocol under which a natural sufficient condition for the LIL exists. A clue can be found in Takazawa [10, 11] where he has showed a weaker upper bound with double hedges. Another clue is the original proof [2] of the Hartman-Wintner LIL that uses a delicate truncation (see also Petrov [6] ). Thus we consider a game with stronger hedges large enough to do the truncation.
For simplicity we only consider an extra hedge h with the following conditions.
Assumption 1.3.
(i) h is an even function.
(ii) h ∈ C 2 and h(0) = h ′ (0) = h ′′ (0) = 0.
(iii) h ′′ (x) is strictly increasing, unbounded and concave (upward convex) for
We state our main result.
Theorem 1.4. In UFQSH with h satisfying Assumption 1.3, Skeptic can force
A n → ∞ and
This theorem is a consequence of Proposition 2.5 (upper bound, validity) and Proposition 2.7 (lower bound, sharpness) below. This theorem has the following corollary. 
In UFQSH with this h and m n ≡ m, v n ≡ v and w n ≡ w, the following are equivalent for m ′ ∈ R and v ′ ≥ 0.
(i) m ′ = m and v ′ = v.
(ii) Skeptic can force lim sup
(iii) Reality can comply with (2).
The definition of "comply" is given in Definition 2.11. Examples for h in this case are h(x) = |x| α , 2 < α ≤ 3, and h(x) = (x + 1) 2 ln 2 (x + 1) − x 2 . See Example 2.3 and Example 2.4 below. We review some related results. The LIL was proved in Kolmogorov [3] under the condition of |x n | = o( A n / ln ln A n ). Marcinkiewicz and Zygmund [4] constructed a sequence of independent random variables for which A n → ∞ and |x n | = O( A n / ln ln A n ) and which does not obey the LIL. A number of other sufficient conditions for Kolmogorov's LIL were given in the literature such as [1, 7] . In an important case of independent, identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables, Hartman and Wintner [2] proved that existence of a second moment suffices for the LIL and Strassen [9] proved conversely that existence of a second moment is necessary.
A game-theoretic version of Kolmogorov's LIL was established by Shafer and Vovk [8] , in which a game-theoretic version of Hartman-Wintner's LIL was questioned. As we stated, Takazawa [10, 11] also obtained some related results. Our main result gives a sufficient condition for game-theoretic Kolmogorov's LIL with an extra hedge slightly stronger than the quadratic one. The corollary has a similar form as Hartman-Wintner's LIL and Strassen's converse although stronger hedges are assumed in our case.
Facts and proofs
In this section we give a proof of our main theorem and its corollary. For readability our proof is divided into several sections. We also prove some facts of independent interest.
Consequences of the assumptions on the extra hedge
From now on we assume m n ≡ 0 without loss of generality until Section 2.6. (ii)
is strictly increasing and unbounded for x ≥ 0.
(iii) For 0 ≤ c ≤ 1 and for x ≥ 0 we have
For c ≥ 1 and for x ≥ 0
Proof. (i) Since h ′′ (0) = 0 and h ′′ is continuous, for each ǫ > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that
Thus lim x→0 h ′ (x)/x = 0. By a similar way, we can show that lim x→0 h(x)
x 2 = 0.
(ii) The strict monotonicity of h ′ (x)/x is equivalent to that, for y > 0,
The last inequality holds because
We prove that h ′ (x)/x is unbounded. Since h ′′ is increasing and unbounded, for any C > 0, there exists D > 0 such that
(iii) We prove that h(cx) ≥ c 3 h(x) for c ≤ 1. By the concavity of h ′′ , we have
The case of c ≥ 1 is obtained from the first case by replacing c and cx by 1/c and x, respectively.
(iv) By the proof of (ii), for any C > 0, there exists D > 0 such that
Since C is arbitrary,
(v) By the inequality of (iv), for x ≥ 1,
(vi) Writing y = c and b = x, by (iii) for any b > 0 we have
It is easy to check numerically that the maximum of the right-hand side is less than 2.
A generalized Hölder's inequality
Recall that a game is called coherent if Reality can make the capital not to increase at any round. Intuitively the coherence means existence of a probability measure such that Reality moves as if her move is based on the measure. If h(x) = x k , then, by Hölder's inequality, we expect that the coherence implies
We give a similar inequality for a general hedge h, which we will use later. Proposition 2.2. In UFQSH with h satisfying Assumption 1.3, the game is coherent if and only if h( √ v n ) ≤ w n for all n.
Proof. Consider
Since the case v n = 0 or w n = 0 is trivial, we assume v n , w n > 0. By Skeptic's collateral duty, if M = 0, then W > 0 or V > 0. We only consider this case. 
thus we ignore this case. Furthermore we can let
where U = −V /W > 0. The game is not coherent if and only if
Hence for given U , the solution x = x(U ) of f ′ (x) = 0 is uniquely given by
and f takes the unique minimum at x = x(U ). Now the right-hand side of (3) is strictly increasing in x. Hence x(U ) is strictly increasing in U . By the assumption on h,
We now maximizef (U ). Differentiatingf (U ) we havẽ
This implies thatf takes the unique maximum at
Hence the game is not coherent if and only if h( √ v n ) − w n > 0 for some n.
Examples of the stronger hedge
We give concrete examples of the stronger hedge satisfying the conditions in Corollary 1.5.
Then h satisfies Assumption 1.3 and the condition (1).
Example 2.4. More elaborate example is the following hedge:
This follows from the fact that for large C the following integral converges:
Differentiating h(x) successively we have
0) = 0 and h ′′ is strictly increasing, unbounded and concave.
Upper bound (validity)
We show the upper bound of the LIL under our assumptions. Proposition 2.5. In UFQSH with h satisfying Assumption 1.3, Skeptic can force
By Theorem 1.2, it suffices to show the following lemma.
Lemma 2.6. In UFQSH with h satisfying Assumption 1.3, Skeptic can force
Proof. We consider the strategy with
as long as Skeptic can keep K n non-negative where ǫ > 0 is small and D is sufficiently large. More precisely, we adopt a strategy combining accounts starting with D = 1, 2, 3, . . . as in Miyabe and Takemura [5] . We show that this strategy forces (5) .
The capital process is
.
By Proposition 2.1, we have
For a large D, the strategy keeps K n non-negative. Hence Skeptic can force that
is finite for each ǫ.
Lower bound (sharpness)
Next we show the lower bound of the LIL under the same assumptions.
Proposition 2.7. In UFQSH with h satisfying Assumption 1.3, Skeptic can force
For our proof of the lower bound we closely follow the line of argument in Section 5.3 of Shafer and Vovk [8] . Compared to Section 5.3 of Shafer and Vovk [8] we will explicitly consider rounds before appropriate stopping times. Also we will be more explicit in choosing ǫ's and δ's.
We assume that a sufficiently small ǫ > 0 is chosen first and fixed. For definiteness we let ǫ < 1/8. We choose ǫ * = ǫ * (ǫ) > 0 sufficiently small compared to ǫ, choose δ = δ(ǫ, ǫ * ) > 0 sufficiently small, and finally choose C = C(ǫ, ǫ * , δ) > 0 sufficiently large. More explicitly, i) ǫ * has to satisfy (21) below, ii) δ has to satisfy (10), (11), (13), (14), (15), (18), (20), (21), (23) below, and iii) C has to satisfy (19), (20), (25) below.
Let κ be such that κ ≤ 2 ln ln C C .
Define stopping time τ 1 , τ 2 , τ 3 by
Approximations
Lemma 2.8. In UFQSH with h satisfying Assumption 1.3, there exists a mar-
for n such that n = τ 2 < τ 1 , τ 3 . Furthermore L n is positive and
Proof. Consider the martingale L satisfying L( ) = 1 and
We show that L n is positive for n < τ 1 , τ 3 . First we prove that
For i < τ 1 , we have
Then
and
Next we prove that
Next we show the inequality (8) for this L n . We claim that
for all i. If κx i ≥ 0, then this inequality clearly holds. If κx i ≤ −1, then
thus the left-hand side of (12) is non-positive. If −1 < κx i < 0, then
Note that
for sufficiently small δ. Note that w i /h(κ −1 ) ≤ δ for i ≤ n < τ 1 and
we have
On the other hand, if
Combined with them, we have
By the inequality (9), we have
A n + 4δ ln ln C for sufficiently small δ such that
Hence (8) is proved. The inequality above also implies (7) because, for n = τ 2 ,
Lemma 2.9. In UFQSH with h satisfying Assumption 1.3, there exists a posi-
The proof is the same as Lemma 5.2 in Shafer and Vovk [8] , except that we also explicitly consider n < τ 2 . 
for sufficiently small δ we have
Since ln(1 + t) ≤ t,
It follows that
Hence (16) is proved. The last inequality implies (17) because, for n = τ 2 ,
for sufficiently large C such that 3 ln ln C > δ(1 + δ).
(19)
Construction of a martingale
Lemma 2.10. Choose C sufficiently large for a given ǫ. In UFQSH with h satisfying Assumption 1.3, there exists a martingale N such that
(ii) For n such that n = τ 2 < τ 1 , τ 3 and
Proof. Choose ǫ * and δ sufficiently small and C sufficiently large. Let
Define a martingale M n by
where L ≤,κ n is the martingale bounded from above in Lemma 2.8 and L ≥,κ n is the martingale bounded from below in Lemma 2.9. Furthermore define N n by
Since M( ) = 1, N ( ) = 1. First we prove that M n ≤ 0 for n = τ 2 < τ 1 , τ 3 and
This is negative because
for sufficiently small δ and sufficiently large C such that
Next we prove that N n is positive for n ≤ min(τ 1 , τ 2 ) < τ 3 . We distinguish two cases depending on the value of S n . Consider the case that
Hence writing
and in this case N n is positive for large C. Now consider the other case
and N n is positive for large C.
Hence at round n ≤ min(τ 1 , τ 2 ) < τ 3 , N n is positive for large C in both cases.
We finally consider the case n = τ 3 ≤ τ 1 , τ 2 . The difficulty with the stopping time τ 3 is that it depends on Reality's move x n , thus it is after Skeptic uses the strategy that Skeptic know whether n = τ 3 . We need to make sure that N n is positive even if Reality has chosen a very large |x n | at the round n. By (vi) of Proposition 2.1
Hence for all x i and κ > 0
and the relative growth of L ≤,κ2 n is bounded by 3 from above. Hence at n =
n−1 . Also for all x i and κ > 0
Hence the relative growth of L ≥,κ3 n is bounded by 1/3 from below. Hence at
Then N n is positive at n = τ 3 ≤ τ 1 , τ 2 . by choosing C large enough in (22) and (24) such that (ln C) cǫ−1 < 1/3 and (ln C)
Strategy forcing the lower bound
Here we discuss Skeptic's strategy forcing the lower bound in Proposition 2.7.
For each sufficiently small ǫ > 0, we want to construct a positive capital process K n such lim sup n K n = ∞ for any path satisfying the antecedent in (6) and
for all sufficiently large A n . We also assume that Skeptic is already employing a strategy forcing the upper bound in LIL for −S n with a small initial capital. Hence S n ≥ −(1 + ǫ) √ 2A n ln ln A n for all sufficiently large A n . For a path satisfying the antecedent in (6) and the inequality in (26), at the round n ′ with A n ′ = (D + 1)A n we have
Recall that we assumed ǫ < 1/8 for definiteness. For this D = 1/ǫ 4 it is easily seen that for all sufficiently large A n we have
Now, if necessary, we increase D to D = max(C, 1/ǫ 4 ), where C is taken sufficiently large to satisfy requirements ((19), (20), (25)) in the previous sections. Now we consider the following strategy based on the strategy of Lemma 2.10 with C replaced by D k where k ∈ N.
Start with initial capital K = 1. Set k = 1. Do the followings repeatedly: C := D k . Apply the strategy in Lemma 2.10 until
The "until" command is understood exclusively for (i), but inclusively (ii) and (iii). If (i) happens, Skeptic does not apply the strategy of Lemma 2.10 and let 0 = M n = V N = W n . He increases k (and C) so that (i) does not hold (such k always exists) and Skeptic can apply the strategy for the increased C. If (ii) happens, Skeptic continues to apply the strategy and go to the next k after that. Note that, Skeptic can observe whether (i) or (ii) happened or not before his move, because (i) and (ii) only depend on Forecaster's move, but he knows whether (iii) happens or not only after Skeptic applied a strategy, so "until" command should be inclusive for (iii). This point was already discussed at the end of our proof of Lemma 2.10.
Suppose that the path satisfies the antecedent in (6) and the inequality in (26). Since A n → ∞, k will go indefinitely by (ii).
First we claim that
The second formula follows from n w n /h(b n ) < ∞ and the third formula follows from n w n /h(b n ) < ∞ and Kronecker's lemma. We show that
Suppose otherwise. Then, for some c such that 0 < c < 1,
for infinitely many n.
for infinitely many n, which contradicts the fact that
by Proposition 2.2. We claim that (i) and (iii) happen only finitely many times. Consider the case that k is sufficiently large. Then n is large, thus, by the fact showed above, we have
If A n ≥ C, then A n−1 < C. Then, in any case,
A n ln ln A n < δA n , which implies C > (1 − δ)A n .
Since A n is sufficiently large too,
A n ln ln A n < (1 − δ)A n ln ln(1 − δ)A n , thus, by (27), we have
w i ≤ δh( C ln ln C ) and |x n | ≤ δ C ln ln C .
Hence (i) and (iii) do not happen when k is sufficiently large. Note that k is set to be k + 1 at all but finitely many times. As we showed above, we have
Hence from some k on (ii) always happens and n i=1
x i ≤ (1 − ǫ) √ 2C ln ln C will be satisfied. Then lim sup n K n = ∞ because
This completes the proof of Proposition 2.7.
Proof of the corollary
Finally we give a proof of Corollary 1.5. First we give the definition of compliance.
Definition 2.11 (Miyabe and Takemura [5] ). By a strategy R, Reality complies with the event E if (i) irrespective of the moves of Forecaster and Skeptic, both observing their collateral duties, E happens, and
(ii) sup n K n < ∞.
Theorem 2.12 (Miyabe and Takemura [5] ). In the unbounded forecasting, if Skeptic can force an event E, then Reality complies with E.
This theorem also holds for UFQSH by essentially the same proof.
Proof of Corollary 1.5. The implication of (i)⇒(ii) immediately follows from the main result. The implication of (ii)⇒(iii) follows from the result above.
Let us show (iii)⇒(i). Consider the case that Skeptic uses the strategy with which he can force lim sup
and that Reality uses the strategy with which she can comply with (2). Then both (2) and (28) hold for the realized path {x n }. This implies (i).
Discussion

